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Abstract
Cyber attacks threaten the security of distribution power grids, such as smart grids. The emerging
renewable energy sources such as photovoltaics (PVs) with power electronics controllers introduce new
potential vulnerabilities. Based on the electric waveform data measured by waveform sensors in the
smart grids, we propose a novel cyber attack detection and identification approach. Firstly, we analyze the
cyber attack impacts (including cyber attacks on the solar inverter causing unusual harmonics) on
electric waveforms in distribution power grids. Then, we propose a novel deep learning based mechanism
including attack detection and attack diagnosis. By leveraging the electric waveform sensor data
structure, our approach does not need the training stage for both detection and the root cause diagnosis,
which is needed for machine learning/deep learning-based methods. For comparison, we have evaluated
classic data-driven methods, including -nearest neighbor (KNN), decision tree (DT), support vector
machine (SVM), artificial neural network (ANN), and convolutional neural network (CNN). Comparison
results verify the performance of the proposed method for detection and diagnosis of various cyber
attacks on PV systems.
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1. Introduction
Power grids have become more vulnerable to cyber threats than
before (Sarangan et al., 2018). Power electronics converters are becoming more
vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to their growing penetration in Internet of
Things (IoT) enabled applications, including the smart grids (Balda et al., 2017).
In response to this emerging concern, developing cyber-secure power
electronics converters has received increased attention from the IEEE power
electronics society (PELS) that recently launched a cyber-physical-security
initiative. There are two main reasons: First, to improve the operation efficiency
and eliminate human intervention, the power grid has been more and more
connected, resulting in increasing challenges in reliability, security, and stability.
Second, a significantly increased amount of distributed energy resources
(DERs), such as solar photovoltaic (PV) (Liu et al., 2016) that are typically
power electronics converters, are being incorporated into smart grids. Due to
the lack of cyber awareness in power electronics community (Balda et al., 2017),
it becomes more urgent to develop cyber-attack detection and identification
strategies for power electronics converters in many safety-critical applications
since these malicious attacks can lead to a catastrophic failure and substantial
economic loss if not detected in the early stage.
Attacks are studied in applications which are intensively dependent on
power electronics converters, including power grids with voltage support
devices (Chen et al., 2013), distribution systems with solar farms (Isozaki et al.,
2016), with power electronics driven HVAC (Heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning) systems (Cao et al., 2018), and microgrids (Liu et al., 2017;
Zhang et al.,2019). However, they mostly focus on either analyzing or detecting
cyber-attacks affecting grid-level stability, functionality, and operational costs.
In Sridhar and Govindarasu (2014), a model-based method was developed to
detect data integrity attacks on automation generation control of transmission
systems. In Isozaki et al. (2016), a physical-law based detection was developed
to detect false data attacks that attempt to reduce the output power of solar
energy in distribution systems. In Cao et al. (2018), a secure information flow
framework was developed for 118-bus distribution network with power
electronics driven HVAC system. In Sahoo et al. (2018), a physics-based,
cooperative mechanism was developed to detect stealthy attacks in DC
microgrids with multiple of DC-DC converters, which can bypass most of
observer-based detection methods. In Beg et al. (2017), a physics-based
framework to detect false-data injection attacks in DC microgrids with multiple
DC-DC converters. While power electronics converters are included in their
cyber-security monitoring frameworks, they are designed to detect one
particular type of grid-level cyber-attacks, but those on the devices (power
electronics converters) are not studied. Thus, their cyber-security framework is
not applied to (1) cyber-attack detection on power electronics converters, which
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might affect the performance of power electronics converters, and (2) the root
cause identification when a variety of attacks occur.
As smart grids are evolving to complex cyber-physical systems (CPS),
there might be a variety of cyber-attacks including coordinated attacks. To
mitigate the vulnerability, model-based and data-driven methods have been
proposed (Esmalifalak et al., 2014). However, model-based methods that rely
on the accurate mathematical models of the healthy systems are hard to be used
in real applications because of an unavoidable model-reality mismatch for the
complexity of power electronics-based smart grids. Data-driven methods, on the
other hand, employing measured data without an explicit mathematical model,
are currently receiving attention (Li et al., 2019b; 2019c). To date, the grid
security heavily focuses on the system-level and almost neglects the devicelevel security, particularly power electronics converters, which has not been
well addressed (Balda et al., 2017). In our previous work (Li et al., 2019d), we
detected and diagnosed a variety of cyber-physical threats for distribution
systems with PV farms, including cyber-attacks on the solar inverter controller,
cyber-attacks on relays/switches, and other faults (e.g., short circuit faults).
Data-driven approaches are gaining increased attention in recent years due to
the advancements in sensing and computing technologies (Liu et al., 2018;
Ferreira et al., 2015; Mahela et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2019). They show great
potentials in detecting and identifying complicated cyber-attacks. The data
sources for these purposes include solar power plants, wind turbines,
hydroelectric plants, marine turbines, phasor measurement unit (PMU),
microgrids, fault detectors, smart meters, smart appliances and electric
vehicles (Tan et al., 2017). In Amini et al. (2015), A data-driven time-frequency
analysis was proposed to detect the dynamic load altering attacks. In Zhou et al.
(2018), a data-driven hidden structure semi-supervised machine was proposed
to implement the power distribution network attack detection. In Lu et al. (2018),
multistream data flow was employed to build effective and efficient attackresilient solutions against the cyber threats targeting electric grids. In Tian et al.
(2018), a data-driven and low-sparsity false data injection attack strategy
against the smart grid was investigated. In Xun et al. (2018), a machine learning
solution was proposed to identify the false data injection attacks on transmission
lines of smart grids. Existing data-driven approaches, however, have not yet
been used to detect cyber-attacks at the device level (power electronics
converters). Thus, a data-driven methodology is needed to detect and identify a
variety of cyber-attacks, that negatively affect both the power electronics
converter (such as a solar inverter) and other critical components (such as relays
and generators) in power grids.
Fig. 1 shows the diagram of the distribution power grid with solar farms.
The solar farm is physically connected to the distribution grid through the
DC/DC, DC/AC converters, and the grid-connected transformers. Then the
major components and control center are connected through cyber networks.
The attacks in red are the potential cyber-attacks on the control center (such as
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2020/Research/1
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data integrity attacks on inverter feedback/control signals or some abnormal
delay injected to the control signal), which will compromise the performance of
the grid and power electronics converters; cyber-attacks can also target the
power grid facilities (such as single/multiple phase short circuit faults of
transformers/generators, abnormal load/capacitor bank cut-off). We need to
detect and diagnose cyber-attacks to the distribution power grids with PV
systems. Compared with the traditional hardware protections, for example,
relays, we develop a comprehensive data-driven solution to adaptively,
efficiently, and accurately monitor the power grid with various power
electronics devices, protecting the system from cyber-attacks, even subtle ones.

Figure 1. Cyber-attacks threaten the security of the distribution power grid with a
solar farm.

In this paper, we propose to develop a data-driven methodology to detect and
identify the cyber-attacks on the distribution power grid with solar farms. We
first analyze and simulate the impacts of cyber-attacks on electrical waveforms
in the distribution power grid with solar farms. Here, we propose a data-driven
deep sequence learning method for automatic cyber-attack diagnosis of smart
grids with PVs based on feature extraction, anomaly detection, and feature
characterization. Unlike our previous approach, we propose to use only one
voltage sensor and one current sensor at the point of common coupling for PV
systems to detect and diagnose cyber-attacks on DC/DC and DC/AC converters.
We test and evaluate our approach in a MATLAB model of the distribution
power grid with solar farms in different cyber-attack scenarios (more than 3000
cases). Here, we assume that the waveform sensor at the point of common
coupling (PCC) is secure and trustworthy. In real applications, its

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2020

3

KSU Proceedings on Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice, Event 1 [2020]

communication channel can be encrypted to ensure the security of waveform
data. We propose to use multilayer long short-term memory (MLSTM)
networks (Gers et al., 1999) to handle intrinsic sequential characteristics of
streaming sensor data. Five data-driven methods are engaged as comparison
methods, which are 𝐾-nearest neighbor (KNN), decision tree (DT), support
vector machine (SVM), artificial neural network (ANN), and convolutional
neural network (CNN). Finally, the contributions and innovations of our work
are:
1.We develop a novel framework that effectively detects and identifies
both cyber-attacks on the grid level and device level (power electronics
converters) in the distribution power grid with solar farms.
2.We propose an innovative waveform data based signal processing and
online statistics associated method to detect the cyber-attacks. The
proposed data-driven method detects attacks based on the dependence
structure of multi-dimensional streaming sensor data.
3.We propose to use the feature distribution of latent variables based on
matrix factorization to diagnose the cyber-attack types. The proposed
attack diagnosis approach does not require a training stage, which is
superior to machine learning/deep learning-based methods in terms of
computational efficiency.

2. Cyber-Physical Modeling and Control of PVs
In general, solar farms include four major components: solar panels, first stage
DC/DC converter, second stage DC/AC inverter, and the grid-connected
transformer. Here, we analyze, detect, and identify cyber-attacks on the solar
inverter, causing the unusual harmonics and then poor power quality in
distribution systems.

Figure 2. Main circuit topology of the inverter.𝑺𝟏 ∼ 𝑺𝟔 denote the switching signals.

The main topology of the solar inverter is shown in Fig. 2, and the
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2020/Research/1
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generalized physical model of DC/AC solar inverter is derived as follows:
𝑑𝑖𝑎
𝑅
𝑒𝑎 𝑉𝑑𝑐
= − 𝑖𝑎 − +
(2𝑠𝑎 − 𝑠𝑏 − 𝑠𝑐 ),
𝑑𝑡
𝐿
𝐿
3𝐿
𝑑𝑖𝑏
𝑅
𝑒𝑏 𝑉𝑑𝑐
(1)
= − 𝑖𝑏 − +
(−𝑠𝑎 + 2𝑠𝑏 − 𝑠𝑐 ),
𝑑𝑡
𝐿
𝐿
3𝐿
𝑑𝑖𝑐
𝑅
𝑒𝑐 𝑉𝑑𝑐
{ 𝑑𝑡 = − 𝐿 𝑖𝑐 − 𝐿 + 3𝐿 (−𝑠𝑎 − 𝑠𝑏 + 2𝑠𝑐 ),
where the control signals 𝑠𝑎 , 𝑠𝑏 , 𝑠𝑐 will be sent from the cyber system and are
defined as:
1 (𝑆1 = 1, 𝑆4 = 0)
,
0 (𝑆1 = 0, 𝑆4 = 1)
1 (𝑆3 = 1, 𝑆6 = 0)
𝑠𝑏 = {
,
0 (𝑆3 = 0, 𝑆6 = 1)
1 (𝑆5 = 1, 𝑆2 = 0)
𝑠𝑐 = {
,
0 (𝑆5 = 0, 𝑆2 = 1)
𝑠𝑎 = {

(2)

where, 𝑖𝑎 , 𝑖𝑏 , 𝑖𝑐 are the currents of each phase, 𝑒𝑎 , 𝑒𝑏 , 𝑒𝑐 are the phase
voltages of the power grid and 𝐿 and 𝑅 are the inverter inductance and
resistance, 𝑉𝑑𝑐 is the DC bus voltage after the first stage DC/DC converter. To
simplify the analysis process, direct-quadrature-zero (DQZ) transformation is
adopted (Ye et al., 2010):
𝑑𝑖𝑑
1
1
𝑅
= − 𝑒𝑑 + 𝑉𝑑𝑐 𝑆𝑑 + 𝜔𝑖𝑞 − 𝑖𝑑 ,
𝐿
𝐿
𝐿
{ 𝑑𝑡
(3)
𝑑𝑖𝑞
1
1
𝑅
= − 𝑒𝑞 + 𝑉𝑑𝑐 𝑆𝑞 − 𝜔𝑖𝑑 − 𝑖𝑞 ,
𝑑𝑡
𝐿
𝐿
𝐿
where 𝜔 is the electric angular frequency, and the control input is transformed
as 𝑆𝑑 and 𝑆𝑞 , and other variables are all corresponding to the 𝑑 − and 𝑞 −
axis components.
Fig. 3 shows the control diagram of the solar farm system, and the cyberattack on the solar inverter is denoted red, which injects a false signal to the
solar inverter control signals. Cyber-attacks disrupt the system by manipulating
data or introducing corruption. Attacks are assumed to happen between the end
devices (or sensors) and the control center, e.g., smart grid measurement data
can be attacked in conjunction with the solar panel measurement data. Cyberattacks are usually defined as mixing the original data/measurements vector
with a malicious vector (Beg et al., 2017):
𝒁 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑾 + 𝒁0 ,

(4)

where 𝒁 is the compromised data vector that is eventually used by the system,
𝒁0 is the true measurement, 𝑾 is a general compromised data vector which
can be independent or determined by 𝒁0 , 𝛼 is a multiplicative factor that
defines the weight of the attack vector.
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2020
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Figure 3. Control diagram of the solar farm system.

3. Methodology
3.1. Problem setup
Suppose we have sequential observations at 𝑘 sensors, 𝑥1 (𝑡), 𝑥2 (𝑡), … , 𝑥𝑘 (𝑡).
Before the emergence of the attack, the observations are normal conditions
following the electronic model 𝜂(⋅) described in Section 2 with a random
noise, i.e., 𝜖(𝑡) ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 ) . When an attack occurs, the observations at
different sensors will capture it but with different responses. We assume the
attack signal is causal, i.e., 𝜂(𝑡) = 0, ∀𝑡 < 0.
For the 𝑖th sensor, the observed data can be expressed as:
𝑥𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝜂(𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖 (𝑡),
𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝜏,
𝑥𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 𝜂∗ (𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖 ) + 𝜖𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑡 = 𝜏 + 1, 𝜏 + 2, … ,

(5)

where 𝛼𝑖 is the unknown amplitude of the change at the 𝑖th sensor. A sensor
data matrix 𝑋 can be constructed, 𝑋(𝑡) = [𝑥1 (𝑡), … , 𝑥𝑘 (𝑡)], 𝑋 ∈ ℝ𝑘×𝑛 , 𝑛 is
the data sample number.

3.2. Feature Extraction
The measured normal waveform data are typically sinusoidal functions for AC
power grids. In order to extract the waveform information with impacts from
different attacks, we need to extract signal features first, such as the health index
in Liu et al. (2013) and signal quality measurements in Yang et al. (2019).
3.2.1. Instantaneous Features
The waveforms of voltage and current signals 𝑽 = [𝑉1 , 𝑉2 , … , 𝑉𝑁 ]𝑇 , 𝑰 =
[𝐼1 , 𝐼2 , … , 𝐼𝑁 ]𝑇 are measured from a network with size 𝑁 the nodal, where
depending on the number of phases at node 𝑖, 𝑉𝑖 and 𝐼𝑖 can be row vectors of
size 1, 2, or 3. In order to characterize the waveform properties, we adopt
instantaneous properties from:
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2020/Research/1
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𝑠𝑐 (𝑡) = 𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑗ℋ{𝑠(𝑡)} = 𝐴(𝑡)𝑒 𝑗𝜓(𝑡) ,

(6)

where 𝑠(𝑡) is the real signal, 𝑠𝑐 (𝑡) is the complex expression, 𝐴(𝑡) is the
instantaneous amplitude (IA) (envelope), 𝜓(𝑡) is the instantaneous phase(IP),
ℋ is the Hilbert transform as:
∞

1
𝑠(𝜏)
ℋ{𝑠(𝑡)} = ∫
d𝜏.
𝜋
𝑡−𝜏

(7)

−∞

Thus, for a three-phase current 𝐼𝑛 = [𝐼𝑛𝐴 , 𝐼𝑛𝐵 , 𝐼𝑛𝐶 ]𝑇 , where 𝐼𝑛𝐴 =
𝐴𝐼𝑛𝐴 𝑒 𝑗𝜓𝐼𝑛𝐴 (𝑡) . Similarly, 𝑉𝑛 can be expressed as 𝑉𝑛 = [𝑉𝑛𝐴 , 𝑉𝑛𝐵 , 𝑉𝑛𝐶 ]𝑇 , where
𝑉𝑛𝐴 = 𝐴𝑉𝑛𝐴 𝑒 𝑗𝜓𝑉𝑛𝐴 (𝑡) .
3.2.2. Differences
The changes of the nodal DC voltages and branch currents can be expressed as:
Δ𝑉𝑛 = 𝑉𝑛 (𝑡) − 𝑉𝑛 (𝑡 − 𝑤),

(8)

Δ𝐼𝑛𝑝 = 𝐼𝑛𝑝 (𝑡) − 𝐼𝑛𝑝 (𝑡 − 𝑤),

(9)

where, 𝑤 is the analysis window size, 𝑛 and 𝑝 denote two arbitrary
neighboring nodes.
For the AC voltages and currents, considering the instantaneous features in
Section 3.2.1, the differences can be expressed as:
Δ𝑉𝑛𝐴 = 𝐴𝑉𝑛𝐴 (𝑡) − 𝐴𝑉𝑛𝐴 (𝑡 − 𝑤),

(10)

Δ𝐼𝑛𝑝𝐴 = 𝐴𝐼𝑛𝑝𝐴 (𝑡) − 𝐴𝐼𝑛𝑝𝐴 (𝑡 − 𝑤),

(11)

where only Phase A is showed, Phases B and C have the similar expressions. In
the normal distribution power grids, the voltages and currents should be stable.
If abnormal changes happen to Δ𝑉𝑛 and Δ𝐼𝑛𝑝 , an event can be detected based
on certain thresholding methods (Li et al., 2019b; 2019c). Here, instead of
directly using the difference, we treat it as one dimension of the highdimensional detection metrics matrix.
3.2.3. Unbalance
In the AC power grids, single, two, or even three-phase issues could exist. The
waveforms of Phases A, B, and C allow a relatively straightforward phase
unbalance characterization based on direct comparisons of phase signal
attributes. Based on the IA defined in Eq. (6), we define the current unbalance
characterization functions 𝐼𝛼 , 𝐼𝛽 , and 𝐼𝛾 as:

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2020
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𝐼𝑛𝛼

1
=
3

𝑖,𝑗∈{𝐴,𝐵,𝐶}

∑

( 𝐴𝐼𝑛𝑖 − 𝐴𝐼𝑛𝑗 )2 .

(12)

𝑖≠𝑗

𝐼𝑛𝛽 =

𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛
,
𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥

(13)

𝑖,𝑗∈{𝐴,𝐵,𝐶}

𝐼𝑛𝛾 =

∑

Γ (𝐴𝐼𝑛𝑖 , 𝐴𝐼𝑛𝑗 ),

(14)

𝑖≠𝑗

where, 𝐼𝑛,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max { 𝐴𝐼𝑛𝐴 , 𝐴𝐼𝑛𝐵 , 𝐴𝐼𝑛𝐶 } and 𝐼𝑛,𝑚𝑖𝑛 = min { 𝐴𝐼𝑛𝐴 , 𝐴𝐼𝑛𝐵 , 𝐴𝐼𝑛𝐶 },
Γ denotes a thresholding function to measure the difference. If 𝐼𝛽 is not zero,
there exists an unbalance among the three phases. Then we use 𝐼𝛾 to determine
how many phases are affected and 𝐼𝛼 to measure the absolute changes.
Similarly, we can also get 𝑉𝛼 , 𝑉𝛽 , and 𝑉𝛾 .

3.3. High-dimensional Data Matrix Construction
In Section 3.1, we build a data matrix 𝑋 in general, and 𝑋 ∈ ℝ𝑘×𝑛 with 𝑛
being the number of data samples and 𝑘 being the number of sensors. Because
of the feature extraction in Section 3.2, the streaming data from one node on an
AC distributed power grid become high dimensional instead of just one. For a
DC node, the feature matrix is [𝑉, 𝐼, Δ𝑉, Δ𝐼]𝑇 , while an AC node has the matrix
[𝐴𝑉𝐴 , 𝐴𝑉𝐵 , 𝐴𝑉𝐶 , 𝐴𝐼𝐴 , 𝐴𝐼𝐵 , 𝐴𝐼𝐶 , Δ𝑉𝐴 , Δ𝑉𝐵 , Δ𝑉𝐶 , Δ𝐼𝐴 , Δ𝐼𝐵 , Δ𝐼𝐶 , 𝑉𝛼 , 𝑉𝛽 , 𝑉𝛾 , 𝐼𝛼 , 𝐼𝛽 , 𝐼𝛾 ]𝑇 .
Note that for a node, the current measurements could be more than one as the
connections with other nodes can be multiple. So the listed matrices are still
general formats. In reality, the feature matrices will have even larger dimensions.
In short, the detection data matrix combines all the feature matrices from all the
nodes in the networks and will be used for attack detection and root cause
diagnosis. Thanks to the recent growth in wireless communication, monitoring
data, even over a large area can be efficiently collected (Parikh et al., 2010).

3.4. Attack Detection Model
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are various states of PV
systems, including the normal state and under-attack states with various attack
types. Because it is difficult to accurately detect and identify various types of
attacks simultaneously, we propose to first focus on detecting whether the PV
system is under attack or not. We apply the one-class detection as the attack
detection model, which has been widely applied for outlier detection to
accurately classify the normal and under-attack states (Maglaras and Jiang,
2014). Training a one-class detection model only requires normal data, which
is an advantage for a potentially large number of attacks.
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2020/Research/1
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Our proposed detection model is expressed as
𝑔(𝒙(𝑡)) = sgn (𝒢 ∗ (𝒙(𝑡)) − 𝜌),

(15)

where 𝒙(𝑡) denotes a vector of time series of smart grid sensor data from 𝑡 −
𝐿 to 𝑡. 𝒢 ∗ is the trained one-class model. 𝜌 is the detection error threshold
(DET), so if the prediction error is larger than DET, it may indicate an anomaly.
A sign function is defined as
1
if 𝛼 ≥ 0,
sgn ( 𝛼): = {
.
−1 if 𝛼 < 0.

(16)

3.5. Attack Diagnosis Model
The attack identification is actually a classification model based on a multiclassification model to identify attack types. Nevertheless, the seriousness of
the same type of attack is also important but has not been well explored. Also,
the cross-entropy loss function often in practice means a cross-entropy loss
function for classification problems and a mean squared error loss function for
regression problems (Goodfellow et al., 2016). Therefore, to analyze not only
the attack types but also the seriousness, we propose a cross-entropy loss
between the empirical distribution defined by the training set and the probability
distribution defined by the model, following
𝐽(𝜃) = −𝔼𝑥,𝑦∼𝑝̂data log 𝑝model (𝒚|𝒙).
(17)

3.6. Multilayer LSTM based Deep Sequence Learning
Since we try to model electric waveform data which have complicated nonlinear temporal characteristics, we leverage the LSTM model. The structure of
the recurrent neural network (RNN) utilizes the information memory at the
previous time to apply to the current sequence data prediction. However, RNN
training long sequences in a multilayer network will generate gradient
disappearance and explosion (Bengio et al., 1994). While LSTM uses the
concept of the gate structure to control the state of the unit layer at each time to
retain the data information. The benefits of LSTM cells are in using the guided
gates for selectivity, remembering both short and long-term behaviors across
many time series, which effectively solves the problem of gradient diffusion
and explosion. Fig. 4 shows the proposed MLSTM architecture, which not only
remembers sequential information but also carries out more rigorous screening
of time information. So, we can generalize the behavior complexity of the PV
system without a huge dataset. Specifically, hyperparameters for MLSTM
models are batch size = 128, learning rate = 0.001, hidden size = 32, optimizer
= Adam, number of layers = 2 (detection) / 5 (diagnosis), which. The parameters
are obtained through experiments and trials. Note that CNN shares most of the
hyperparameters of MLSTM in our study.
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Figure 4. Proposed multilayer LSTM architecture.

4. Algorithm
Based on the theories introduced in Section 3, we propose an online high
dimensional data-driven cyber-attack detection and diagnosis algorithm, whose
workflow is shown in Fig. 5.

Figure 5. Workflow of the proposed approach. The attack detection is highlighted
with red shadow, and the attack diagnosis result is in yellow.

First, electric waveform data are obtained continuously to construct
streaming data. As the streaming data are measured from the sensors in the
distribution power networks, the streaming data matrix has high dimensions
with AC and DC voltages and currents. Before the feature extraction, a typical
pre-processing operation filters out the noise interferences and conditions the
data if data samples are missing or timestamps are not stable. Using the Eqs. (6)
to (14), from the high dimensional data matrix, we build a high dimensional
feature matrix, whose dimension is even higher. Based on the MLSTM attack
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2020/Research/1
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detection model, the abnormal changes in the feature matrix can be detected.
Otherwise, if there is no anomaly, the whole system will analyze the next
streaming data segmentation. Once an anomaly is detected, we apply the
diagnosis model to identify the attack types. The advantage of using an attack
detection step before the attack diagnosis is the efficiency, as the diagnosis is
more time and computation consuming than the detection.

5. Simulation
A simulation-based on MATLAB Simulink, 400kW Grid-Connected PV Farm
Network, is conducted to generate waveforms of some typical fault in small
scale power network. The main power grid is modeled as an ideal voltage source,
and the load is linear. One rate voltage of 260𝑉/25𝑘𝑉, 400kVA, transformer
connects the PV farm, which includes four DC/DC converters and one DC/AC
inverter, to the power grid. The power network topology is shown in Fig. 6.

Figure 6. Simulation topology of a 400 kW Grid-Connected PV Farm Network.

The power grid is modeled as an ideal voltage source with a rated voltage of
120 kV and connected to the sub-transmission network with a rated voltage of
25 kV through a 47 MVA power transformer. The PV farm includes four solar
blocks, each of them connected to the DC bus through a DC/DC converter. A
three-phase inverter is adopted to transfer the DC power to the AC. To match
the voltage level of the sub-transmission system, a 400 kVA power transformer
is used to connect the PV farm and the sub-transmission system. Moreover, four
linear loads are modeled in the system: 30 MW on Bus 4, denoted the power
grid load, 100 kW and 2 MW on Bus 5 and Bus 6, denoted the sub-transmission
system loads, and 40 kvar reactive power compensation on Bus 1 as well as a 2
Mvar reactive power compensation on Bus 4, modeled as capacitive power
loads. Under normal operation conditions, the voltage and current waveforms
of Bus 2 are shown in Fig. 7.
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2020
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Here, cyber-attacks on the DC/DC controller sensor only change the
current and voltage of the PV panel. Following the cyber-attack model in Eq. (4),
𝛼𝑉 and 𝛼𝐼 represent the fake measurement coefficient of voltage and current
in the PV panel. (𝛼𝑉 , 𝛼𝐼 ) ∈ [(0,0), (2,3), (2,0.3), (0.5,3), (0.5,0.3)]. For the
DC/AC controller, the cyber-attacks inject a time delay into sensor feedback,
𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 ∈ [0,4𝑚𝑠, 6𝑚𝑠, 8𝑚𝑠, 10𝑚𝑠, 12𝑚𝑠, 14𝑚𝑠].
Considering the uncertainty of cyber-attacks, the attacks happened at
different time are simulated in our model, such as phase angles
0∘ , 30∘ , 60∘ , 90∘ , 120∘ , 150∘ , 180∘ . To test the robustness of the proposed
method towards different conditions, we also consider the irradiation impact on
power generation. The irradiation on the PV panel varies in the ranges of 900,
941, 967, 988, 1000 w/m2. Thus, more than 3,900 training samples are simulated.
The waveform at the point of common coupling is obtained to verify our
proposed method. The sampling frequency is 50k Hz, and 0.5 seconds (s) data
are simulated for each scenario, which has 25001 samples. Note that, to clearly
illustrate details, we only plot 0.1 s data around the event time in Figs. 7~12.

Figure 7. Normal operation condition waveforms of (left) the voltage and (right)
current on Bus 2.

Using the simulation system described above, we simulate typical cyberattack conditions, each of which has featured waveforms. Short circuit fault is
one of the most common physical faults in power systems, which could be
caused by human behaviors and natural hazards, such as maloperations, cyberattacks, storms, and lighting. The outcomes of short circuit faults depend on
many factors such as fault location, short fault type, and severe degree damage.
So, four different short circuit faults are simulated.
Main grid grounded short circuit fault: A single-phase grounded short circuit
fault of Bus 4 results in distortion of the voltage and the current. The waveform
of Bus 4 is shown in Fig. 8, it is easy to note that this fault causes transient
impacts on currents and spike voltage and steady-state asymmetric components.

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2020/Research/1
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Figure 8. Main grid single phase grounded short circuit fault waveforms of (left) the
voltage and (right) current on Bus 4.

Solar transformer grounded short circuit fault: The short circuit faults
happen on Bus 2, which can be single-phase or double-phases. A double-phase
(phase a and phase b) grounded short circuit fault waveforms of Bus 4 are shown
in Fig. 9. Note that the fault current is even more severe than that from the main
grid fault described above.

Figure 9. Solar transformer double phases (phase a and phase b) grounded short
circuit fault waveforms of (left) the voltage and (right) current on Bus 2.

Extra reactive power compensation in solar system: Fig. 10 shows the
waveforms of Bus 1 when the PV farm is injected extra reactive power
compensation, which is possibly caused by false data injection in the control
center. In the simulation model, extra reactive power is modeled as a capacitive
power load and injected to Bus 1, which could be caused by maloperations and
purposeful attacks.
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Figure 10. Extra reactive power compensation in solar system waveforms of (left) the
voltage and (right) current on Bus 1.

PV farm inverter attacked: The solar inverter hacked situation is simulated.
A 1 ms delay is added to the inverter controller signal to simulate the “data
integrity” attack (Yang et al., 2019). The waveforms of Bus 1 are shown in
Fig. 11.

Figure 11. PV farm inverter attacked waveforms of (left) the voltage and (right)
current on Bus 1.

30MW linear load cut off: Heavy load cutting off is another common fault in
the power system which, could be caused by the integrity attack to the control
center. When a heavy load is cut off in a short period, the power system will
generate severe oscillations. The waveforms of Bus 4 are shown in Fig. 12.

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2020/Research/1
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Figure 12. 30 MW linear load cut off waveforms of (left) the voltage and (right)
current on Bus 4.

6. Evaluation
6.1. Pre-processing and Feature Extraction
The first step of the proposed algorithm is the normalization. Because our
approach is based on matrix structure analysis, the unbalanced amplitudes
among different observations will influence the following statistical analysis.
Thus, we normalize the data matrix before the feature extraction, and one
example of the main grid grounded short circuit fault in Fig. 8 is shown in
Fig. 13. Note that, the AC components are normalized according to their IAs,
while DC components are based on their maximum and minimum values in the
segments. There are six nodes (5 AC nodes and 1 DC node) in Fig. 6, so the
vectors in the data matrix are aligned following the node number.

Figure 13. Data matrix normalization in the situation of main grid grounded short
circuit fault. (Left) Raw waveform matrix; (Right) Normalized waveform matrix. Each
vector corresponds to one voltage or current waveform, which is either one phase of
AC components or one DC component. As there are 5 AC nodes and 1 DC node, the
data matrix dimension is 32.
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Based on the normalized data matrix, we extract the feature matrix
according to Section 3.2. Since AC components generate instantaneous features,
differences, and unbalances, while DC components do not have the unbalance
features, the dimension of feature matrix is 32+32+30=94, shown in Fig. 14.
With the sophisticated the feature extraction, the latent data structure
information is better characterized, and the attack detection robustness can also
be improved. Comparing Fig. 13 and Fig 14, it is clear that the feature matrix
exhibits more information of the data anomaly than the original data matrix,
which is valuable for attack detection and diagnosis.

Figure 14. Feature matrix extracted from the normalized waveform matrix shown
in Fig. 13. The total dimension is 94, including 32 columns of instantaneous features,
32 columns of differences, and 30 columns of unbalances.

6.2. Comparison Models
To validate the performances of the proposed MLSTM method, classic machine
learning and deep learning models, such as KNN, SVM, DT, ANN, and CNN,
are compared, which are powerful data-driven methods with a wide range of
applications (Goodfellow et al., 2016). For the machine learning models, data
features, such as frequency, amplitude, phase angle (because of AC waveform),
spectrum properties, are extracted. For deep learning models, data streams are
managed to be fed into models. We implemented them through Pytorch
(1.3.1) (Paszke et al., 2017) and Sklearn (0.22.1) (Pedregosa et al., 2011) on an
Ubuntu 16.04 server (CPU: i7-6850K, 3.60 GHz, RAM 64GB) armed with GPU
(GeForce GTX 1080 Ti). For the validation purpose, we utilize ten-fold
randomized cross-validation with 80% training data and 20% testing data for
the model training. To quantitatively evaluate method performances, we employ
accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score, which are obtained from the confusion
matrix for detection and classification evaluation (Li et al., 2019a). We adopt
an offline training and online testing strategy.
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6.3. Metrics
To quantitatively evaluate method performances, we employ accuracy,
precision, recall, and F1 score, which are obtained from the confusion matrix
for detection and classification evaluation (Li et al., 2019a). The confusion
matrix has indexes of True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), False Negative
(FN), and True Negative (TN). Precision (TP/(TP+FP)) that represents the true
fault detection rate is expected to be as high as possible, because the higher
precision is, the less false alarm. Recall (TP/(TP+FN)) represents the ability to
find all data points of interest. In our case, the higher recall is, the more true
attacks are detected. Similarly, F1 (2TP/(2TP+FP+FN)=2 precision
recall/(precision+recall)) that represents the combination property of precision
and recall is expected to be as high as possible.

Figure 15. (a) CNN and (b) MLSTM loss curves in the attack diagnosis with window
length 100 (0.1 s).

6.4. Attack Detection Performance Evaluation
In the attack detection stage, all data-driven models are trained under the oneclass model structure, which is simple with efficient computations. So, the
attack detection model has ensured its applicability in practice and thus achieves
a real-time manner. Table 1 shows the evaluation metrics: accuracy, recall,
precision, and F1 score. In order to further characterize the model sensitivity,
we also test the analysis window with different window lengths. It is clear that
the proposed MLSTM achieves the best performances in terms of all metrics,
with only two layers. SVM cannot achieve good performance, maybe because
the data structure is too complicated. KNN and DT show acceptable
performances, but not as good as CNN and MLSTM. Due to the shallow model
depth, ANN does not show ideal performances, while CNN achieves very good
performances with only two layers. Compared with CNN, MLSTM achieves
high detection accuracy even when the window size is 50 (0.05 s), and with
longer analysis window length, MLSTM can even do better.
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6.5. Attack Diagnosis Performance Evaluation
Different from attack detection where only normal and abnormal data are
labeled, attack diagnosis requires more detailed data analysis. Because of the
data unbalance that normal condition has a large amount of available data. At
the same time, each attack scenario only has limited available data, the accuracy
of all data-driven models is high, but some have really bad recall, precision and
F1 scores, as listed in Table 2. However, MLSTM and CNN still show the
advantages of deep learning models even with five layers. Besides the slightly
better performances in terms of metrics compared with CNN, MLSTM has
another advantage. Fig. 15 displays the training and testing performances of
CNN and MLSTM with the same analysis window length. MLSTM shows a
smoother loss curve, which means it potentially has better model robustness and
stable performances. Notice that MLSTM demonstrates the best performances
when the analysis window size is 80 or 100. Although the metrics achieved
other peaks with window size 200, that would be overfitting on interferences.
Table 1. Detection performance evaluation using metrics (Accuracy, F1, recall and
precision).
Window Size
SVM
KNN
DT
ANN
CNN
MLSTM
Window Size
SVM
KNN
DT
ANN
CNN
MLSTM

50
0.79/0.47/0.31/0.96
0.90/0.83/0.83/0.84
0.92/0.86/0.81/0.92
0.85/0.85/0.81/0.85
0.93/0.93/0.91/0.93
0.97/0.97/0.96/0.97
140
0.71/0.36/0.22/0.96
0.90/0.87/0.87/0.87
0.91/0.89/0.91/0.87
0.85/0.85/0.85/0.86
0.94/0.94/0.93/0.94
0.97/0.97/0.97/0.97

80
0.77/0.43/0.28/0.97
0.91/0.85/0.86/0.85
0.92/0.86/0.82/0.92
0.91/0.91/0.90/0.91
0.97/0.97/0.97/0.97
0.98/0.98/0.97/0.98
160
0.69/0.36/0.22/0.97
0.89/0.86/0.87/0.86
0.93/0.91/0.92/0.91
0.82/0.82/0.80/0.82
0.95/0.95/0.95/0.95
0.97/0.97/0.96/0.97

100
0.75/0.42/0.27/0.96
0.91/0.87/0.87/0.87
0.91/0.87/0.86/0.88
0.91/0.91/0.90/0.91
0.97/0.97/0.97/0.97
0.98/0.98/0.97/0.98
200
0.67/0.34/0.21/0.98
0.88/0.86/0.85/0.87
0.93/0.92/0.94/0.89
0.75/0.73/0.70/0.78
0.97/0.97/0.97/0.97
0.98/0.98/0.98/0.98

Table 2. Diagnosis performance evaluation using metrics (Accuracy, F1, recall and
precision).
Window Size
SVM
KNN
DT
ANN
CNN
MLSTM
Window Size
SVM

50
0.95/0.12/0.11/0.12
0.95/0.02/0.02/0.02
0.95/0.12/0.12/0.12
0.95/0.10/0.09/0.10
0.91/0.83/0.83/0.84
0.97/0.93/0.90/0.96
140
0.93/0.01/0.01/0.11

80
0.94/0.03/0.02/0.09
0.94/0.01/0.01/0.01
0.95/0.06/0.05/0.06
0.95/0.09/0.08/0.10
0.95/0.90/0.87/0.93
0.97/0.94/0.93/0.96
160
0.93/0.01/0.01/0.14
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100
0.95/0.11/0.11/0.12
0.95/0.02/0.01/0.02
0.95/0.12/0.12/0.12
0.96/0.11/0.11/0.11
0.95/0.94/0.91/0.97
0.98/0.95/0.92/0.97
200
0.93/0.08/0.08/0.08
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KNN
DT
ANN
CNN
MLSTM

0.93/0.01/0.01/0.02
0.93/0.04/0.03/0.04
0.94/0.06/0.03/0.13
0.95/0.92/0.90/0.95
0.96/0.92/0.91/0.94

0.93/0.01/0.01/0.01
0.93/0.04/0.03/0.05
0.94/0.06/0.05/0.08
0.96/0.93/0.90/0.96
0.96/0.93/0.90/0.96

0.92/0.01/0.01/0.01
0.93/0.06/0.06/0.06
0.93/0.12/0.12/0.12
0.97/0.96/0.96/0.96
0.98/0.97/0.96/0.97

7. CONCLUSION
Solar farms and other renewable energy sources bring potential attack
vulnerabilities to distribution power networks. We propose a cyber security
mechanism by combining a one-class detection model and an attack diagnosis
model, which are tailored for electric waveform profiles of a solar PV smart
grid for real-time attack detection and identification. First, an analysis was
conducted on cyber-attacks on the smart grid with solar PV farm embedded.
Features of the streaming waveform data are constructed to be an analysis
matrix, which has the inherent data structure. Then, an MLSTM based
comprehensive approach was developed. We apply the one-class detection
model to detect whether a PV farm is under attack or not. When it is detected to
be under attack, we identify the attack type by leveraging the attack diagnosis
model. The proposed mechanism has been evaluated using a MATLAB
Simulink solar farm model and achieves much-improved attack detection and
diagnosis performances.
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